International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Differential Pursuit–Evasion Games in the Hilbert Space ℓ2

Oct 1, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

We constructed optimal strategies for players of a differential pursuit-evasion game in sequence space ℓ2 under point-wise contraints. The players are one evader, and a countable number of pursuers who evolve under differential equations of first order for pursuers and of second order for the evader. At the end of a fixed time θ, the payoff is the distance between the evader and the closest pursuer. The pursuers aim to minimize the payoff while the evader seeks to maximize it. (with Mehdi Salimi)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Emissions Caps and Abatement R&D: The Profitability of a Zero-Emissions Cap

Sep 24, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

This paper studies how asymmetric emissions caps affect firms’ decisions on output and abatement R&D in a duopoly, building on the work of Amir et al. (2023, Env Mod. Assess). The main result is that a firm facing a zero-emissions cap chooses higher output and abatement R&D than its less strictly regulated rival and, if initial unit abatement costs are sufficiently low, may earn higher payoffs. Alternatively, the model can be considered as a duopoly in which one firm receives an R&D subsidy.

(joint work with Rabah Amir)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Rethinking climate change models: A death by a thousand cuts

Sep 17, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

This paper develops a dynamic model of climate policy adoption under two types of uncertainty. The first type captures gradual changes caused by accumulation of greenhouse gases. The second source of uncertainty are major environmental disasters that cause abrupt cuts to the consumption. Disasters arrive at jump times of a Poisson process of unknown intensity. Using a gamma distribution as a prior for the intensity, the model provides a transparent decision rule for policy timing. It offers an alternative to standard cost-benefit analysis by allowing for adaptive responses without relying on extreme assumptions about fat tails or low discount rates.