International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: On the Desirability of the Global Minimum Tax – A Dynamic View

    Nora Paulus
    University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    On the Desirability of the Global Minimum Tax – A Dynamic View

    Mar 26, 2026 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    Corporate tax competition has driven statutory rates downward for decades, eroding fiscal capacity and raising concerns about global equity. The OECD/G20 Global Minimum Tax (GMT) seeks to mitigate this “race to the bottom”, yet its dynamic implications remain unclear.

    We study the GMT with a differential game of international tax competition with mobile capital. Governments set corporate tax rates while multinational firms reallocate capital in response to effective tax wedges created by the minimum tax and the substance-based income exclusion. We distinguish between Markovian behavior, in which governments adjust tax rates in response to current capital allocations, and open-loop behavior, in which they commit to tax paths in advance. We also compare enforcement through Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Taxes (QDMTT) and the Income Inclusion Rule (IIR).

    In the Markovian game, the GMT does not pin down a unique long-run outcome: a continuum of steady states arises under both enforcement regimes, including low-tax configurations. By contrast, under open-loop commitment the dynamic system is saddle-point stable, implying convergence to a unique transition path for given initial conditions. Commitment therefore acts as a dynamic selection device. Whether the economy converges to high- or low-tax configurations depends on enforcement: under QDMTT, a race to the bottom may emerge when public revenue is used inefficiently and the minimum tax is sufficiently high, whereas under IIR such dynamics are ruled out. Overall, the GMT can stabilize tax competition under commitment but does not, in general, eliminate downward pressure on statutory rates.

    (with Weihua Ruan and Benteng Zou)

  • DGA Seminar: Store-Wide Space Planning with Multiple Objectives – Retailing Meets Health and Queueing Theory

    Bacel Maddah
    American University of Beirut, Lebanon

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Store-Wide Space Planning with Multiple Objectives – Retailing Meets Health and Queueing Theory

    Feb 20, 2026 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Hybrid seminar at HEC Montréal, room EY (1st floor, blue section) or Zoom

    A growing research stream concerns space planning that takes a “store-wide” view by considering the problem of allocating all product categories to store shelves, a problem also referred to “macro space planning.” This talk presents recent work on store-wide space planning emphasizing different objective functions, e.g., impulse profit, shopping convenience, and health. The methodology of the research emphasizes spatial demand models, which are embedded in nonlinear integer programs that are then linearized to provide good solutions with popular solvers. We describe the key building blocks of these recent models, and discuss managerial insights and computational challenges, within the context of two supermarkets in different continents.

    Viewing the shopping area as a self-service system with infinite capacity, classical queueing theory, mainly Little’s law and the standard M/G/∞ system, provides useful insights and allows expanding the scope of the model. We explicitly capture aspects such as social distancing constraints, shopping visit duration, and the effect of traffic variability.

  • DGA Seminar: Stable partitions in networks with the costs dependent on neighborhood composition

    Ping Sun
    Qingdao University, China

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Stable partitions in networks with the costs dependent on neighborhood composition

    Feb 5, 2026 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    We study a discrete-time, infinite-horizon process of partition formation. We introduce two cost functions for maintaining connections within a network, allowing the cost of a link between two players to depend on the composition of each player’s neighborhood. Stable partitions are characterized when players interact on a star network, a complete network, and on balanced complete bipartite networks. Finally, we apply the model to Zachary’s karate club network, providing an explanation for why two specific individuals can be viewed as group leaders. Numerical simulations on random networks further illustrate the process and underscore the theoretical intractability of the problem. (With Elena Parilina)