International Society of Dynamic Games

  • Third Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications: Paris, France, 17-18 October, 2024

    You are kindly invited to participate in the Third Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications, to be held on

    17-18 October, 2024 in Paris, France

    The deadline for abstract submission is 20 August.

    Additional information about the Workshop is available at

    Looking forward to welcoming you in Paris.

    The organisers
    Bernard Crettez, CRED, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
    Naila Hayek, CRED, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
    Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, LEMMA, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas
    Georges Zaccour, GERAD, HEC Montréal

  • DGA Seminar: Joseph Abdou

    Joseph Abdou
    Université Paris 1

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Towards a category of the political

    May 2, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    We construct a category that provides the foundations of political structures viewed as simplicial complexes. The objects of the category are political sites. The morphisms are transformations that account in particular for merging or splitting of political parties. Every political site induces one political structure. A morphism between two political sites induces a transformation in the corresponding political structures.

  • Seminar: Lucia Sbragia

    Lucia Sbragia
    Durham University

    Seminar, Department of Decision Sciences, HEC Montreal

    International environmental agreements in the presence of adaptation and self-image

    April 30, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    We examine the stability and effectiveness of an international environmental agreement when countries can decide both their emissions and adaptation levels. We assume that adaptation requires a prior irreversible investment and presents the characteristics of a private good by reducing a country’s vulnerability to the impact of pollution, while mitigation policies produce a public good by reducing the total amount of pollution. By using a stylized model capturing the main features of the Paris agreement, we show that investments in adaptation do not ameliorate the participation to the agreement, total emissions by countries are higher than when countries can only emit, and that global welfare is higher with adaptation than without. All this suggests that adaptation is beneficial even if there may be a loss in participation. We also investigate the impact of a regulated adaptation.

    (joint work with Michèle Breton)