International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Emissions Caps and Abatement R&D: The Profitability of a Zero-Emissions Cap

Sep 24, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

This paper studies how asymmetric emissions caps affect firms’ decisions on output and abatement R&D in a duopoly, building on the work of Amir et al. (2023, Env Mod. Assess). The main result is that a firm facing a zero-emissions cap chooses higher output and abatement R&D than its less strictly regulated rival and, if initial unit abatement costs are sufficiently low, may earn higher payoffs. Alternatively, the model can be considered as a duopoly in which one firm receives an R&D subsidy.

(joint work with Rabah Amir)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Rethinking climate change models: A death by a thousand cuts

Sep 17, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

This paper develops a dynamic model of climate policy adoption under two types of uncertainty. The first type captures gradual changes caused by accumulation of greenhouse gases. The second source of uncertainty are major environmental disasters that cause abrupt cuts to the consumption. Disasters arrive at jump times of a Poisson process of unknown intensity. Using a gamma distribution as a prior for the intensity, the model provides a transparent decision rule for policy timing. It offers an alternative to standard cost-benefit analysis by allowing for adaptive responses without relying on extreme assumptions about fat tails or low discount rates.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Differential games with age-structured populations: a general framework for closed-loop epsilon-Nash equilibria

Sep 10, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

This paper studies differential games with age-structured state variables, where the state depends on both time and an age variable representing cohorts, durations, or maturity classes. We propose tools for constructing approximate Nash equilibria under dual closed-loop information structures. A verification theorem is established that allows one to check whether a given strategy profile constitutes such an approximate equilibrium. This theorem does not require the regularity assumptions typically imposed by standard optimal control techniques, which are often not satisfied in games. Our main result establishes conditions under which these dual $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria are equivalent to classical closed-loop $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria. This provides a practical verification criterion for determining when a strategy profile is indeed a closed-loop $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in the original age-structured game.