International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: One Climate, Different Agreements: Understanding the Architecture of Global Environmental Governance

    Michèle Breton
    Professor, Department of Decision Sciences, HEC Montréal, Canada

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    One Climate, Different Agreements: Understanding the Architecture of Global Environmental Governance

    Nov 19, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar (link)

    International environmental agreements (IEAs) are treaties negotiated, signed, and ratified by individual nation-states to address environmental problems that trespass national borders. Because no supranational authority can force a sovereign state to join an IEA, any agreement must be self-enforcing, creating a tension between the collective benefits of cooperation and the private incentive to free-ride on the efforts of others.

    In this presentation, we investigate how the nature and design of IEAs affect their effectiveness and attractiveness. We do so within a theoretical framework where countries can respond to climate change via both mitigation and adaptation. We discuss various IEA designs, including top-down and bottom-up approaches, as well as incentives used to secure participation and compliance, and compare them using models from various families proposed in the literature. (With Lucia Sbragia)

    (with Adriana Gama)

  • DGA Seminar: On Cournot’s theory of oligopoly with perfect complements

    Rabah Amir
    University of Iowa, United States

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    On Cournot’s theory of oligopoly with perfect complements

    Nov 12, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar (link)

    This paper provides a thorough characterization of the properties of Cournot’s complementary monopoly model (or oligopoly with perfect complements) in a general setting, including existence, uniqueness and the comparative statics effects of entry. As such, this serves to unify various results from the extant literature that have typically been derived with limited generality. In addition, several studies have suggested that Cournot’s complementary monopoly model is the dual problem to the standard Cournot oligopoly model. This result crucially relies on the assumption that the firms have no production costs. This paper shows that if the production costs of the firms are different from zero, the nice duality between these two oligopoly settings breaks down. One implication of this breakdown is that, in contrast to the Cournot model, oligopoly with perfect complements can be a game of strategic complements in a global sense even in the presence of production costs.

    (with Adriana Gama)

  • DGA Seminar: Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts

    Amal Sakr
    Institut Polytechnique de Paris, France

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts

    Oct 29, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar (link)

    We study investment and pricing in shared infrastructure under revenue uncertainty, congestion, and risk aversion. We consider a Stackelberg game in which an infrastructure provider determines infrastructure capacity and access price, while several firms share the infrastructure and make resource commitments through take-or-pay contracts. We establish the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium and derive probabilistic guarantees on the probability that firms realize positive profits at equilibrium. Numerical experiments reveal that greater risk aversion improves firms’ profitability guarantees but reduces the infrastructure provider’s profit. (with Andrea Araldo, Tamer Basar, and Tijani Chahed)