International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: Rethinking climate change models: A death by a thousand cuts

    Svetlana Boyarchenko
    University of Texas at Austin, United States

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Rethinking climate change models: A death by a thousand cuts

    Sep 17, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar (link)

    This paper develops a dynamic model of climate policy adoption under two types of uncertainty. The first type captures gradual changes caused by accumulation of greenhouse gases. The second source of uncertainty are major environmental disasters that cause abrupt cuts to the consumption. Disasters arrive at jump times of a Poisson process of unknown intensity. Using a gamma distribution as a prior for the intensity, the model provides a transparent decision rule for policy timing. It offers an alternative to standard cost-benefit analysis by allowing for adaptive responses without relying on extreme assumptions about fat tails or low discount rates.

  • DGA Seminar: Differential games with age-structured populations: a general framework for closed-loop epsilon-Nash equilibria

    Dominika Machowska
    Warsaw University, Poland

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Differential games with age-structured populations: a general framework for closed-loop epsilon-Nash equilibria

    Sep 10, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar (link)

    This paper studies differential games with age-structured state variables, where the state depends on both time and an age variable representing cohorts, durations, or maturity classes. We propose tools for constructing approximate Nash equilibria under dual closed-loop information structures. A verification theorem is established that allows one to check whether a given strategy profile constitutes such an approximate equilibrium. This theorem does not require the regularity assumptions typically imposed by standard optimal control techniques, which are often not satisfied in games. Our main result establishes conditions under which these dual $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria are equivalent to classical closed-loop $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibria. This provides a practical verification criterion for determining when a strategy profile is indeed a closed-loop $\varepsilon$-Nash equilibrium in the original age-structured game.

  • ISDG Annals news

    Here are three important items of news related to the Annals.

    The latest Annals, associated with the 20th Symposium of the International Society of Dynamic Games has just been published Advances in Dynamic Games: Theory, Experiments and Applications .

    New annals papers call – there will be a new volume of the Annals associated with the 21st Symposium . The call for papers can be found here.

    Proposals for new Annals volumes – these can follow a research theme and might be tutorial in nature. Please contact the Series Editor Tamer Başar basar1@illinois.edu or any member of the Annals Editorial Board https://link.springer.com/series/4919 to discuss proposals.