International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts

Oct 29, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

We study investment and pricing in shared infrastructure under revenue uncertainty, congestion, and risk aversion. We consider a Stackelberg game in which an infrastructure provider determines infrastructure capacity and access price, while several firms share the infrastructure and make resource commitments through take-or-pay contracts. We establish the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium and derive probabilistic guarantees on the probability that firms realize positive profits at equilibrium. Numerical experiments reveal that greater risk aversion improves firms’ profitability guarantees but reduces the infrastructure provider’s profit. (with Andrea Araldo, Tamer Basar, and Tijani Chahed)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Equilibrium Queueing Strategies in Random Environment

Oct 22, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

We study equilibrium queueing strategies in an M/M/1-type queueing system with strategic customers operating in a two-phase random environment described as a continuous-time Markov process. Strategic customers, upon arrival, choose whether to join or to balk based on available information and anticipated utility, considering the trade-off between reward from service and waiting cost. Four observational scenarios are analysed: fully observable (both queue length and environment phase are disclosed to a customer upon arrival), queue-only observable, environment-only observable, and fully unobservable. In each case, equilibrium joining strategies are analysed. In environment-only observable and fully unobservable cases, explicit solutions and equilibrium conditions are derived under rapid oscillations and under very slow transitions between environment phases. (with Uri Yechiali).

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

In linear-quadratic dynamic games, Riccati–Stein solutions hide in a lifted state space

Oct 8, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

We discuss infinite-horizon open-loop Nash equilibria (OLNE) in discrete-time linear-quadratic dynamic games. By embedding the dynamics into an augmented system, we show that the Riccati–Stein solution of each player coincides with that of a linear-quadratic regulator (LQR) on a lifted space. Building on this insight, we derive a finite-horizon optimal control formulation whose solutions coincide with the infinite-horizon OLNE, and reformulate it as a monotone affine variational inequality (AVI).