International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

On Cournot’s theory of oligopoly with perfect complements

Nov 12, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

This paper provides a thorough characterization of the properties of Cournot’s complementary monopoly model (or oligopoly with perfect complements) in a general setting, including existence, uniqueness and the comparative statics effects of entry. As such, this serves to unify various results from the extant literature that have typically been derived with limited generality. In addition, several studies have suggested that Cournot’s complementary monopoly model is the dual problem to the standard Cournot oligopoly model. This result crucially relies on the assumption that the firms have no production costs. This paper shows that if the production costs of the firms are different from zero, the nice duality between these two oligopoly settings breaks down. One implication of this breakdown is that, in contrast to the Cournot model, oligopoly with perfect complements can be a game of strategic complements in a global sense even in the presence of production costs.

(with Adriana Gama)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Shared Infrastructure Investment and Pricing: Stackelberg Equilibria in Risk-Aware Take-or-Pay Contracts

Oct 29, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

We study investment and pricing in shared infrastructure under revenue uncertainty, congestion, and risk aversion. We consider a Stackelberg game in which an infrastructure provider determines infrastructure capacity and access price, while several firms share the infrastructure and make resource commitments through take-or-pay contracts. We establish the existence of a Stackelberg equilibrium and derive probabilistic guarantees on the probability that firms realize positive profits at equilibrium. Numerical experiments reveal that greater risk aversion improves firms’ profitability guarantees but reduces the infrastructure provider’s profit. (with Andrea Araldo, Tamer Basar, and Tijani Chahed)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Equilibrium Queueing Strategies in Random Environment

Oct 22, 2026   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar (link)

We study equilibrium queueing strategies in an M/M/1-type queueing system with strategic customers operating in a two-phase random environment described as a continuous-time Markov process. Strategic customers, upon arrival, choose whether to join or to balk based on available information and anticipated utility, considering the trade-off between reward from service and waiting cost. Four observational scenarios are analysed: fully observable (both queue length and environment phase are disclosed to a customer upon arrival), queue-only observable, environment-only observable, and fully unobservable. In each case, equilibrium joining strategies are analysed. In environment-only observable and fully unobservable cases, explicit solutions and equilibrium conditions are derived under rapid oscillations and under very slow transitions between environment phases. (with Uri Yechiali).