International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Properties of guaranteed cost equilibrium in scalar infinite horizon linear quadratic differential games

Oct 30, 2025 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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We consider infinite-horizon linear-quadratic differential games (LQDGs) with a state-feedback information structure and guaranteed cost equilibrium (GCE) as the solution concept. Once the players reach a GCE, no player has an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium strategy, as each has achieved a desired upper bound on her cost. In this work, we provide conditions for the existence of a GCE in scalar LQDGs and investigate the related welfare properties. Furthermore, we specialize these results to symmetric and two-player scenarios.

(with Aniruddha Roy)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Evolutionary Dynamics of Costly Signaling

Oct 16, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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In this talk, I give an overview of three recent works joint with Josef Hofbauer on the evolutionary dynamics of costly signaling in three larger classes of games:

games in which the costly signal imposes a cost also on the receiver in case they accept to engage with the sender in the social exchange at stake (hiring, buying, mating). Examples of this last scenario are: agency commissions at conclusion of a contract, sickness presenteeism (attending work while sick), and politeness in language.

classical costly-signaling games à la Spence (education as a costly signal in the job market) and Zahavi (display of ‘handicaps’ in mating, stotting, coloration of autumn leaves), as investigated in Hofbauer and Pawlowitsch (2025 IJGT),

games in which players get a positive payoff increment when producing a signal (Hofbauer and Pawlowitsch 2025, Dynamic Games and Applications), and,

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Peer-to-Peer Sharing, Price Competition, and Consumers’ Awareness

Oct 9, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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In this paper, we present a model of product differentiation where two firms can offer either a standard or a circular version of a product. The latter refers to a version of the good that can be shared in a peer-to-peer sharing platform. Consumers are heterogeneous concerning the amount of time they use the goods for themselves and can end up being either consumers of the standard product, or prosumers or users of the circular product. We characterize the equilibrium for given degree of maturity of the sharing market, maximum consumers’ use intensity and marginal cost differences between the two varieties. Key to our results is whether consumers care for circularity. In the absence of environmental awareness, there is very little space for the circular product when coexisting with a standard variety: the circular good is more expensive, it has a lower market share, and results in lower, albeit positive, profits. Things change dramatically if consumers experience bad conscience when purchasing the standard version: the circular product continues to be more expensive, but it may beat the standard one in market share and profits. This can even result in the two firms offering the circular variety in equilibrium. Our findings suggest that consumers’ environmental awareness can be a key driver for the transition towards the circular economy.

(With F. André, C. Ranocchia and S. Rousseau).