International Society of Dynamic Games

GERAD Seminar

Broker-Trader Partial Information Nash-Equilibria

May 22, 2025 03:00 PM — 04:00 PM (Montreal time)

Hybrid seminar at GERAD joint with Quantact. Zoom webinar link

In Person: room 4488
Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
Campus de l’Université de Montréal
2920, chemin de la Tour Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
Canada

We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this model, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market. Simultaneously, the broker trades these assets in a lit exchange where their actions impact the asset prices. The broker, however, only observes aggregate prices and cannot distinguish between underlying trends and volatility. Both the broker and the informed trader aim to maximize their penalizedexpected wealth. Using convex analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its existence and uniqueness. Furthermore, we establish that this equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a nonstandard system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that involves the two differing filtrations. For short enough time horizons, we prove that the solution of this system exists. Moreover, we show that the solution to the FBSDE system may be approximated by a power series in the strength of the transient impact to arbitrary order and prove that the error is controlled. If time permits, I will also discuss a new deep learning approach for approximating the solution to the system of FBSDEs.

Dena Firoozi organizer

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Influencing Customers and Product Returns

Apr 24, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

Information tools shape consumer behavior in retail but have limited impact on post-purchase decisions. Using a Bayesian Persuasion framework, our model examines the relationship between customer influence and return decisions, considering different return and influence schemes. We uncover the trade-offs between pre-purchase and post-purchase options to identify the optimal level of influence under various return policies in both monopoly and duopoly scenarios. Our findings suggest that product returns can substitute for influence, with partial refunds reducing the need for additional efforts. The dynamics of competition and market structure also prove to have a significant role in driving these decisions.