International Society of Dynamic Games

  • CANCELLED – GERAD Seminar: Sebastian Jaimungal

    Sebastian Jaimungal
    University of Toronto,
    Canada

    GERAD Seminar

    Broker-Trader Partial Information Nash-Equilibria

    May 22, 2025 03:00 PM — 04:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Hybrid seminar at GERAD joint with Quantact. Zoom webinar link

    In Person: room 4488
    Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
    Campus de l’Université de Montréal
    2920, chemin de la Tour Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
    Canada

    We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this model, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market. Simultaneously, the broker trades these assets in a lit exchange where their actions impact the asset prices. The broker, however, only observes aggregate prices and cannot distinguish between underlying trends and volatility. Both the broker and the informed trader aim to maximize their penalizedexpected wealth. Using convex analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its existence and uniqueness. Furthermore, we establish that this equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a nonstandard system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that involves the two differing filtrations. For short enough time horizons, we prove that the solution of this system exists. Moreover, we show that the solution to the FBSDE system may be approximated by a power series in the strength of the transient impact to arbitrary order and prove that the error is controlled. If time permits, I will also discuss a new deep learning approach for approximating the solution to the system of FBSDEs.

    Dena Firoozi organizer

  • 4th Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications, Paris October 23-24, 2025

    You are kindly invited to participate in the Fourth Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications, to be held in Paris on October 23-24, 2025.

    The deadline for abstract submission is August 20.

    Additional information about the Workshop is available at https://www.gerad.ca/colloques/Workshop-DGA-2025/index.html

    Looking forward to welcoming you in Paris.

    The organizers

    Bertrand Crettez, CRED, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas,

    Naila Hayek, CRED, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas,

    Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, LEMMA, Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas,

    Georges Zaccour, GERAD, HEC Montréal

  • DGA Seminar: Influencing Customers and Product Returns

    Reza Nazari Khanmari
    Concordia University, Canada

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Influencing Customers and Product Returns

    Apr 24, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    Information tools shape consumer behavior in retail but have limited impact on post-purchase decisions. Using a Bayesian Persuasion framework, our model examines the relationship between customer influence and return decisions, considering different return and influence schemes. We uncover the trade-offs between pre-purchase and post-purchase options to identify the optimal level of influence under various return policies in both monopoly and duopoly scenarios. Our findings suggest that product returns can substitute for influence, with partial refunds reducing the need for additional efforts. The dynamics of competition and market structure also prove to have a significant role in driving these decisions.