International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Investment in Abatement Capacity when Consumers Value the Environmental Performance of the Supply Chain

Mar 20, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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In this paper, we examine abatement investment and pricing in a supply chain where consumers value environmental performance. The product’s green reputation depends on its pollution rate relative to a declining industry standard. The manufacturer manages abatement investment, with optional cost-sharing by the retailer. Cost-sharing achieves a Pareto-optimal outcome but may increase total emissions by boosting demand. Faster declines in the industry standard reduce abatement investment. Firms with lower initial green reputation – “brown firms” – struggle to catch up, while firms with higher initial states benefit from a cycle of increased investment, enhanced abatement capacity, reduced emissions, and greater goodwill gains.

(With Elena Parilina and Georges Zaccour.)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Optimal Policies in Large Population Games with Applications to Epidemic Control

Mar 13, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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COVID-19 pandemic showed that while designing policies to mitigate an epidemic, regulators should consider the response of large number of interacting agents to these policies. To address this, we propose a Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) model between a government who optimizes mitigation policies and many non-cooperative individuals who chooses their socialization levels to control their jumps between different health states. Nash equilibrium response to the policies is approximated with an MFG. We will give equilibrium characterization and introduce a numerical approach based on machine learning tools. Finally, we will discuss an extension where an underlying network among individuals is implemented via graphon game.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Incentivising Community Self-Consumption in Energy Markets: Stable Coalition Formation Using Cooperative Game Theory

Mar 6, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

This paper examines coalition stability among prosumers and consumers in a local energy community. Using cooperative game theory, we model how coalitions can minimise collective disutility by sharing distributed energy resources (DERs) and optimising battery energy storage system (BESS) operation schedules. For disutility allocation among coalition members, we apply the center-of-gravity of imputation set value (CIS-value), ensuring equitableness and computational feasibility. The analysis focuses on stability of coalition structures, where all possible player’s deviations are considered. We implement a blocking mechanism, where deviations can be blocked by a coalition if one member is made worse off by the deviation. A case study involving ten players is presented, showing that stable coalitions lead to more effective outcomes in terms of cost, emissions, and demand peak reduction. These findings demonstrate that cooperative game theory with coalition stability can enhance community self-consumption (CSC) within local energy communities. (with Khaled Abedrabboh, Luluwah Al-Fagih, Elena Parilina).