International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Incentivising Community Self-Consumption in Energy Markets: Stable Coalition Formation Using Cooperative Game Theory

Mar 6, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

This paper examines coalition stability among prosumers and consumers in a local energy community. Using cooperative game theory, we model how coalitions can minimise collective disutility by sharing distributed energy resources (DERs) and optimising battery energy storage system (BESS) operation schedules. For disutility allocation among coalition members, we apply the center-of-gravity of imputation set value (CIS-value), ensuring equitableness and computational feasibility. The analysis focuses on stability of coalition structures, where all possible player’s deviations are considered. We implement a blocking mechanism, where deviations can be blocked by a coalition if one member is made worse off by the deviation. A case study involving ten players is presented, showing that stable coalitions lead to more effective outcomes in terms of cost, emissions, and demand peak reduction. These findings demonstrate that cooperative game theory with coalition stability can enhance community self-consumption (CSC) within local energy communities. (with Khaled Abedrabboh, Luluwah Al-Fagih, Elena Parilina).

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Game-Theoretic Market Mechanisms for Sharing Distributed Energy Resource

Feb 27, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

As the world transitions towards more sustainable energy systems, the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as renewable energy and storage systems, presents both opportunities and challenges. While DERs offer environmental and economic benefits, their high investment costs, space constraints, and low utilization rates when individually operated limit their efficiency. To address these challenges, innovative market mechanisms are needed to enhance DER utilization and promote cost-effective energy sharing within consumer communities. This talk presents a game-theoretic framework for designing local energy markets (LEMs) that facilitate the efficient allocation of medium-scale DERs. We explore two market mechanisms: the combinatorial double auction (CDA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA), which allow multiple DER providers and consumers to interact strategically while maintaining privacy and optimizing economic and environmental benefits. The talk will cover the mathematical modeling of these auction mechanisms, including social welfare optimization, utility-maximizing bidding strategies for consumers, and revenue-maximizing strategies for DER providers.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Mitigation, Adaptation and Cooperation in Response to Climate Disaster

Feb 20, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Hybrid seminar at GERAD or Zoom link

We consider the tradeoff between mitigation and adaptation in a transboundary pollution game with an environmental regime shift. Countries can lower their emissions to decrease the likelihood that a regime shift takes place or proactively invest in adaptive capital to reduce the impact of the regime shift. We solve for the social planner outcome and the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) and study how the option to adapt affects incentives to mitigate, precautionary behavior and welfare. In the social planner outcome, adaptation complements mitigation and increases welfare, but in the non-cooperative outcome adaptation crowds out mitigation and lowers welfare. Finally, we introduce efficient procedures to numerically calculate MPNE in differential games that cannot be solved analytically.