International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Multiplex networks: stability and opinion dynamics

January 25, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

Interactions among agents or players in the society are usually performed in several layers, therefore, regular one-layer networks cannot properly describe the processes that can be observed in real-world networks. We examine the stability of multiplex networks when players interact in different layers and can reduce their costs of communication by creating connections with the same players in many layers. Then we examine how opinions are distributed in two-layer networks. We propose a general concealed voter model (GCVM), in which individuals interact in two layers and can exchange their opinions in the internal layer. By exchanging opinions in the internal layer, we mean that individuals share their real or internal opinions with their close friends. The process of opinion formation in GCVM is presented in the paper. We make a series of numerical simulations of GCVM with different network structures (both external and internal) and get some counterintuitive conclusions. 

(Joint work with Ziyu Ma and Chi Zhao)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Environmental Regulation under Sequential Competition

November 30, 2023, 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Webinar link

We examine a polluting industry, competing à la Stackelberg, where an emission fee is sequentially set on the leader and the follower. We evaluate the leader’s output advantage, disentangling two effects: the first-mover and cost advantage. We show that environmental regulation decreases the leader’s output advantage, which is positive when firms are asymmetric. We also measure the output inefficiency if the regulator incorrectly assumes the industry competes simultaneously, identifying in which settings this inefficiency is the largest. Our extensions allow for inflexible emission fees, several leaders and followers, product differentiation, and for the follower to hold a cost advantage.