International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

On difference games in infinite-horizon

Oct 3, 2024   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Zoom webinar link

We consider infinite-horizon difference games where the dynamics are governed by difference equations or difference inequalities and present various notions of Nash- equilibrium. Pontryagin maximum principles in both strong and weak forms are provided as necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium by using tools of reduction to the finite horizon and conditions related to the infinite horizon. Some special cases are then examined: the case of bounded processes and the case of asymptotical constraints for which tools of optimization in Banach spaces are used to provide necessary conditions for NE. Sufficient conditions are also studied

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

On the impact of cross-ownership in a common property renewable resource oligopoly

Sep 26, 2024   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Seminar in hybrid format at GERAD room 4488 or Zoom

This paper investigates the effects of cross-ownership structures among firms in a renewable resource industry. We build on previous research to analyze a k-symmetric cross-ownership model where k firms hold equal financial stakes in each other while remaining independent from n-k other firms.

The study finds that cross-ownership can enhance aggregate profits and social welfare by allowing firms to coordinate their production strategies more effectively. We argue that traditional antitrust policies, which often view cross-ownership as detrimental, may overlook the potential benefits in renewable resource contexts. We emphasize the importance of considering the dynamics of resource stocks and the long-term implications of cross-ownership when formulating regulatory policies.

(With Miao Dai and Hassan Benchekroun)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Status Concern and Environmental Awareness in a Common Access Resource Game with Heterogeneous Agents

Sep 19, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Seminar in hybrid format at GERAD room 4488 or Zoom webinar link

In an international context, countries and firms are concerned not only with their consumption/extraction levels of a natural resource. They may also consider their relative position compared to other actors. To understand these consequences, previous work in the literature has studied how agents with status concern (such as e.g., output-based and profit-based status) extract or transform a common pool renewable resource. In this paper, we also introduce the possibility that one (or both) agents care about the quantity of the natural resource. This could be the result of several facts. First, the agents might value the own existence of the resource, for ecological or reputational reasons (environmental awareness). Alternatively, a country could benefit economically (e.g. through tourism) from the existence of the resource. Finally, we examine the effects of asymmetries between agents. (With Carles Mañó-Cabello and Jorge Navas)