International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: Discrimination in games

    Annick Laruelle
    University of the Basque Country UPV/EHU, Spain

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Discrimination in games

    Dec 4, 2025 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    We consider a finite population formed by different types of individuals. Players observe the type of their opponent but do not know their own type. This assumption is discussed in different contexts, such as biology, and medecine. The question that we address is whether in such a symmetric environment a discriminating norm may arise.

  • DGA Seminar: Bargaining with Investment and Endogenous Status-quo

    Francesca Flamini
    Adam Smith Business School, University of Glascow, United Kingdom

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Bargaining with Investment and Endogenous Status-quo

    Nov 27, 2025 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    The novelty of this paper is to investigate bargaining games where not only the status-quo can be (fully/partially) endogenous but parties can also affect the size of the future surplus (via investment). We show that there can be phases of both over- and under-investment under a fully endogenous status-quo. Moreover, players agree to invest more when they are sufficiently patient and investment is not endogenous. Instead, with pronounced asymmetries, both farsighted and shortsighted parties invest more when investment is endogenous. We study the impact of capital depreciation, asymmetry in parties’ patience and status-quo on the equilibrium.

  • DGA Seminar: Differential Game Theoretic Models for Designing Conservation Incentives

    Shima Mohebbi
    George Mason University, United States

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Differential Game Theoretic Models for Designing Conservation Incentives

    Nov 20, 2025 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    This talk focuses on non-cooperative differential game-theoretic models in both deterministic and stochastic settings to design incentive schemes for water users, geographically distributed across a river network, that reduce conflicts and water consumption. We propose solution methods for both convex and nonconvex decision problems and perform parametric analyses to examine how parameters influence the choice of solution methods and affect decision-making processes.