International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Signaling Effort: Information Structures in a Principal-Agent Model

Oct 10, 2024   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Zoom webinar link

We consider a principal-agent relationship where only information messages are contractible, and the agent can design a signal about his effort. The principal may have access to an outside signal that escapes the agent’s control and offers a contract based on the joint signal. In equilibrium, the agent’s signal is informative only if the default contract based on the outside signal only exposes him to a severe and likely punishment. We show that an optimal and informative signal provides weak (strong) evidence of high (low) effort. Surprisingly, the principal does not always benefit from more precise outside signals.

(With Arseniy Samsonov.)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

On difference games in infinite-horizon

Oct 3, 2024   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Zoom webinar link

We consider infinite-horizon difference games where the dynamics are governed by difference equations or difference inequalities and present various notions of Nash- equilibrium. Pontryagin maximum principles in both strong and weak forms are provided as necessary conditions for Nash equilibrium by using tools of reduction to the finite horizon and conditions related to the infinite horizon. Some special cases are then examined: the case of bounded processes and the case of asymptotical constraints for which tools of optimization in Banach spaces are used to provide necessary conditions for NE. Sufficient conditions are also studied

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

On the impact of cross-ownership in a common property renewable resource oligopoly

Sep 26, 2024   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Seminar in hybrid format at GERAD room 4488 or Zoom

This paper investigates the effects of cross-ownership structures among firms in a renewable resource industry. We build on previous research to analyze a k-symmetric cross-ownership model where k firms hold equal financial stakes in each other while remaining independent from n-k other firms.

The study finds that cross-ownership can enhance aggregate profits and social welfare by allowing firms to coordinate their production strategies more effectively. We argue that traditional antitrust policies, which often view cross-ownership as detrimental, may overlook the potential benefits in renewable resource contexts. We emphasize the importance of considering the dynamics of resource stocks and the long-term implications of cross-ownership when formulating regulatory policies.

(With Miao Dai and Hassan Benchekroun)