International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Optimal Policies in Large Population Games with Applications to Epidemic Control

Mar 13, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

COVID-19 pandemic showed that while designing policies to mitigate an epidemic, regulators should consider the response of large number of interacting agents to these policies. To address this, we propose a Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) model between a government who optimizes mitigation policies and many non-cooperative individuals who chooses their socialization levels to control their jumps between different health states. Nash equilibrium response to the policies is approximated with an MFG. We will give equilibrium characterization and introduce a numerical approach based on machine learning tools. Finally, we will discuss an extension where an underlying network among individuals is implemented via graphon game.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Incentivising Community Self-Consumption in Energy Markets: Stable Coalition Formation Using Cooperative Game Theory

Mar 6, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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This paper examines coalition stability among prosumers and consumers in a local energy community. Using cooperative game theory, we model how coalitions can minimise collective disutility by sharing distributed energy resources (DERs) and optimising battery energy storage system (BESS) operation schedules. For disutility allocation among coalition members, we apply the center-of-gravity of imputation set value (CIS-value), ensuring equitableness and computational feasibility. The analysis focuses on stability of coalition structures, where all possible player’s deviations are considered. We implement a blocking mechanism, where deviations can be blocked by a coalition if one member is made worse off by the deviation. A case study involving ten players is presented, showing that stable coalitions lead to more effective outcomes in terms of cost, emissions, and demand peak reduction. These findings demonstrate that cooperative game theory with coalition stability can enhance community self-consumption (CSC) within local energy communities. (with Khaled Abedrabboh, Luluwah Al-Fagih, Elena Parilina).

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Game-Theoretic Market Mechanisms for Sharing Distributed Energy Resource

Feb 27, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

As the world transitions towards more sustainable energy systems, the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as renewable energy and storage systems, presents both opportunities and challenges. While DERs offer environmental and economic benefits, their high investment costs, space constraints, and low utilization rates when individually operated limit their efficiency. To address these challenges, innovative market mechanisms are needed to enhance DER utilization and promote cost-effective energy sharing within consumer communities. This talk presents a game-theoretic framework for designing local energy markets (LEMs) that facilitate the efficient allocation of medium-scale DERs. We explore two market mechanisms: the combinatorial double auction (CDA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA), which allow multiple DER providers and consumers to interact strategically while maintaining privacy and optimizing economic and environmental benefits. The talk will cover the mathematical modeling of these auction mechanisms, including social welfare optimization, utility-maximizing bidding strategies for consumers, and revenue-maximizing strategies for DER providers.