International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: Khaled Abedrabboh

    Khaled Abedrabboh
    Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Game-Theoretic Market Mechanisms for Sharing Distributed Energy Resource

    Feb 27, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    As the world transitions towards more sustainable energy systems, the integration of distributed energy resources (DERs), such as renewable energy and storage systems, presents both opportunities and challenges. While DERs offer environmental and economic benefits, their high investment costs, space constraints, and low utilization rates when individually operated limit their efficiency. To address these challenges, innovative market mechanisms are needed to enhance DER utilization and promote cost-effective energy sharing within consumer communities. This talk presents a game-theoretic framework for designing local energy markets (LEMs) that facilitate the efficient allocation of medium-scale DERs. We explore two market mechanisms: the combinatorial double auction (CDA) and the combinatorial clock auction (CCA), which allow multiple DER providers and consumers to interact strategically while maintaining privacy and optimizing economic and environmental benefits. The talk will cover the mathematical modeling of these auction mechanisms, including social welfare optimization, utility-maximizing bidding strategies for consumers, and revenue-maximizing strategies for DER providers.

  • DGA Seminar: Simon Elgersma

    Simon Elgersma
    University of Groningen, Netherlands

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Mitigation, Adaptation and Cooperation in Response to Climate Disaster

    Feb 20, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Hybrid seminar at GERAD or Zoom link

    We consider the tradeoff between mitigation and adaptation in a transboundary pollution game with an environmental regime shift. Countries can lower their emissions to decrease the likelihood that a regime shift takes place or proactively invest in adaptive capital to reduce the impact of the regime shift. We solve for the social planner outcome and the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) and study how the option to adapt affects incentives to mitigate, precautionary behavior and welfare. In the social planner outcome, adaptation complements mitigation and increases welfare, but in the non-cooperative outcome adaptation crowds out mitigation and lowers welfare. Finally, we introduce efficient procedures to numerically calculate MPNE in differential games that cannot be solved analytically.

  • DGA Seminar: Talat S. Genc

    Talat S. Genc
    University of Guelph, Canada

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Semiconductor Industry with Recycling and Subsidy

    Feb 13, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    This paper examines semiconductor industry in a supply chain context involving a subsidy legislation rewarding end-users for recycling and a return function sensitive to monetary payments. The paper formulates silicon production in upstream industry and semiconductor manufacturing in downstream industry. It characterizes equilibrium outcomes and shows that the subsidy does not distort silicon and semiconductor production and pricing strategies, but enhances returns and contributes to the environment positively by reducing the use of virgin metals and energy.