International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Bargaining with Investment and Endogenous Status-quo

Nov 27, 2025 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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The novelty of this paper is to investigate bargaining games where not only the status-quo can be (fully/partially) endogenous but parties can also affect the size of the future surplus (via investment). We show that there can be phases of both over- and under-investment under a fully endogenous status-quo. Moreover, players agree to invest more when they are sufficiently patient and investment is not endogenous. Instead, with pronounced asymmetries, both farsighted and shortsighted parties invest more when investment is endogenous. We study the impact of capital depreciation, asymmetry in parties’ patience and status-quo on the equilibrium.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Differential Game Theoretic Models for Designing Conservation Incentives

Nov 20, 2025 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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This talk focuses on non-cooperative differential game-theoretic models in both deterministic and stochastic settings to design incentive schemes for water users, geographically distributed across a river network, that reduce conflicts and water consumption. We propose solution methods for both convex and nonconvex decision problems and perform parametric analyses to examine how parameters influence the choice of solution methods and affect decision-making processes.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

A mean field game theory of spatial dynamics in economic geography

Nov 13, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

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We propose a mean-field game (MFG) approach to study the dynamics of spatial agglomeration in a continuous space-time framework where trade across locations may follow a broad class of static gravity models. Forward-looking agents work and migrate in a two-dimensional geography and face idiosyncratic shocks. Equilibrium wages and prices depend on their common distribution and adjust statically according to the underlying trade model. We first prove the existence and uniqueness of the static trade equilibrium. We then prove the existence of dynamic equilibria. Finally, we apply our model to a simple circular geography to understand what the MFG theory can tell us about the forces driving agglomeration and dispersion in a dynamic setting.

(with Raouf Boucekkine and Quentin Petit)