International Society of Dynamic Games

  • 14th ISDG Workshop in Yerevan, Armenia

    As we informed you few days ago, it will not be possible to hold the 14th ISDG Workshop in Qingdao. The new venue of the Workshop is Yerevan, Armenia, at the same dates, i.e., June 11-13, 2025.
    For information about the Workshop, including venue, deadlines, etc., please visit its homepage. (If an old webpage uploads, then please refresh your browser.)

    We look forward to welcoming you at the Workshop.

    The organizers
    Vanya Barseghyan, Elena Parilina (chair), Florian Wagener

  • 14th ISDG Workshop relocates, dates remain the same

    For reasons completely outside of the control of the organising committee, it will not be possible to hold the 14th ISDG Workshop in Qingdao this coming June. They sincerely apologize for any inconveniences that change could cause. Thank you for your understanding.

    A group of ISDG members is now working on securing another location for the event. The search is made under the constraint that the dates remain the same, i.e., June 11-13. Details will be made public soon, including the new deadline for submitting an abstract.

  • DGA Seminar: Market power: A powerful motive for mergers in extractive industries

    Amrita Ray Chaudhuri
    University of Winnipeg, Canada

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Market power: A powerful motive for mergers in extractive industries

    Apr 17, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    We examine firms’ incentives to acquire rivals in an effort to monopolize an exhaustible resource sector, and the equilibrium industry structure that emerges when the acquisition price is endogenous. Given a market structure, firrms compete in quantities: each entity chooses its extraction policy, i.e. a Markovian strategy that allows extraction rate to depend on the vector of stocks. When the firrms’ stocks are sufficiently small, in contrast to the static Cournot case, monopolization becomes a profitable strategy. The firm with the largest stock is the least likely to monopolize the industry. For a given acquirer, the gains from monopolization are only positive if the targets’ stocks are neither too large nor too small. The lower the demand elasticity, the less likely that either extreme case, i.e. monopoly or the unmerged equilibrium, occurs.

    (with Hassan Benchekroun and Ying Tung Chan).