International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Semiconductor Industry with Recycling and Subsidy

Feb 13, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

This paper examines semiconductor industry in a supply chain context involving a subsidy legislation rewarding end-users for recycling and a return function sensitive to monetary payments. The paper formulates silicon production in upstream industry and semiconductor manufacturing in downstream industry. It characterizes equilibrium outcomes and shows that the subsidy does not distort silicon and semiconductor production and pricing strategies, but enhances returns and contributes to the environment positively by reducing the use of virgin metals and energy.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Differential games of public investment

Feb 6, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

We define a differential game of dynamic public investment with a discontinuous Markovian strategy space. The best response correspondence for the game is well-behaved: best responses exist and uniquely map almost all profiles of opponents’ strategies back to the strategy space. Our chosen strategy space thus makes the differential game well-formed, resolving a long-standing open problem and allowing the analysis of a wider class of differential games and Markov-perfect equilibria. We provide a ‘cookbook’ necessary and sufficient condition for constructing the best response, and demonstrate its use with a canonical model of non-cooperative mitigation of climate change. Our approach provides novel, economically important results: we obtain the entire set of symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibria, and demonstrate that the best equilibria can yield a substantial welfare improvement over the equilibrium which previous literature has focused on. Our methods do not require specific functional forms.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Nonlinear Strategies in Symmetrical Two-person Scalar LQ

Jan 30, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Zoom webinar link

Since the often quoted article Tsutsui and Mino 1990, there has been some confusion over what this article proves. Rowat, 2007, uses the same method plus Dockner et al 2000 on another example. We explain that what is proved by Tsutsui and Mino is not what they claim, and what is proved by Rowat is misnamed as a perfect equilibrium. However, Rowat’s example can easily be saved as noted by several authors. Using a more general model, we discuss which parameter values yield his results and we give an explicit and simpler derivation concerning his original piecewise linear strategies.