Chantal Marlats
Université Panthéon-Assas
Paris II
France
Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar
The social value of information in times of epidemic
April 4, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)
We analyze an epidemiological model in which individuals trade the costs and benefits of self-isolation while being uncertain about both their type and the dynamics of the epidemic. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that uncertainty can be the cause of an additional wave of infections. We calibrate our model to the COVID-19 pandemic and simulate the dynamics of the epidemic under various scenarios to illustrate the impact of uncertainty on self-isolation behaviors. We show that uncertainty about the epidemic dynamics may be welfare improving, both in terms of fraction of deaths and average payoffs. (with Dominique Baril-Tremblay and Lucie Ménager)