International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Climate policy under political pressure

November 23, 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Webinar link

We propose a theoretical framework to study the implications of political pressure on optimal climate policy. A key feature of the framework is its ability to capture dynamic inconsistency, which naturally arises from the long time horizon of climate policies and their susceptibility to modifications due to political pressure. Our findings offer a new rationale for why green lobbying can make pollution regulation less stringent. We also show that political pressure from the polluting sector leads to a higher rate of clean energy investment chosen by the government and can facilitate the transition from dirty to clean technologies. (with Andrei Kalk)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Assessing the Impact of Payments for Environmental Services on a Bioeconomic Supply Chain Equilibrium

November 16, 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

Webinar link

The study investigates the efficacy of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) in combatting climate change and biodiversity loss in bioeconomic supply chain management. Using variational inequality methods and a multi-criteria decision-making framework, we validate our claims through numerical simulations driven by an optimized machine learning algorithm. Our results demonstrate potential reductions exceeding 50% in greenhouse gas emissions and biodiversity loss. PES play a pivotal role but are not standalone; success requires a combined strategy involving an economic decoupling effect, heightened environmental awareness, and targeted incentives. Sustainable practices and resource efficiency improvements are equally vital for a substantial ecological footprint reduction.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

The Value of Information in Zero-Sum Games

November 9, 2023
11:00 AM – 12:00 PM (Montreal winter time)

Webinar link

By the Minimax Theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern, Zero-Sum games are known to have a value, the expected value to one of the players when both play an optimal strategy. In the following we model Zero-Sum games where players face a hard information/entropy constraint as in the work of Christopher Sims (2003). The resulting game reveals an enlarged set of optimal randomized mixed strategies and can be shown to have an Informational Value which is a measure of the informational robustness of the game. In an example the randomized equilibria (which do not exist when information/entropy constraints are ignored) are derived, the geometric properties of the Shannon/Stratonovich Value of information investigated, and the Informational Value calculated.