International Society of Dynamic Games

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Comparative Dynamics in a Dynamic Oligopoly Model of Capital Accumulation

Nov 14, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Zoom webinar link

We revisit the generalized finite horizon dynamic oligopoly model of capital accumulation in a differential game setting and use the Oniki’s variational method to investigate the comparative dynamics of a symmetric Open-loop Nash Equilibria (OLNE) of the game with respect to several variables. We are able to trace the entire path of the comparative dynamics of these variables over the time horizon and we are thus able to determine the dynamics of the effects of changes in the parameters on the symmetric OLNE. An immediate implication of our derived comparative dynamics is that they give sharper envelope predictions than results in the existing literature. For example, we show that the initial value of a firm’s own costate variable underestimates the shadow value of the initial capital stock.

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

Subsidizing a New Technology: An Impulse Stackelberg Game Approach

Oct 31, 2024 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal SUMMER time)

Zoom webinar link

Governments are motivated to subsidize profit-driven firms that manufacture zero-emission vehicles to ensure they become price-competitive. This paper introduces a dynamic Stackelberg game to determine the government’s optimal subsidy strategy for zero-emission vehicles, taking into account the pricing decisions of a profit-maximizing firm. While firms have the flexibility to change prices continuously, subsidies are adjusted at specific time intervals. This is captured in our game formulation by using impulse controls for discrete-time interventions. We provide a verification theorem to characterize the Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium and illustrate our results with numerical experiments. (with Georges Zaccour)

Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

A Stackelberg game approach to evaluate the effectiveness of cap-and-trade regulation under disruption

Nov 7, 2024   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM

Seminar in hybrid format at GERAD room 4488 or Zoom

This study explores the impact of cap-and-trade regulations on the performance of dual-channel green supply chains in the presence of disruptions. It examines the interplay between pricing and greening strategies under cap-and-trade conditions and varying market demand disruptions. The model employs a Stackelberg game framework involving an eco-friendly product manufacturer and a retailer, applicable to centralized and decentralized systems. Results show that a dynamic cap-and-trade system can provide the needed flexibility to adjust emission allowances in real time, and dynamic regulatory frameworks should be supported to balance emission management with supply chain profitability.