International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: Peer-to-Peer Sharing, Price Competition, and Consumers’ Awareness

    Carmen Arguedas
    Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Peer-to-Peer Sharing, Price Competition, and Consumers’ Awareness

    Oct 9, 2025   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Zoom webinar link

    In this paper, we present a model of product differentiation where two firms can offer either a standard or a circular version of a product. The latter refers to a version of the good that can be shared in a peer-to-peer sharing platform. Consumers are heterogeneous concerning the amount of time they use the goods for themselves and can end up being either consumers of the standard product, or prosumers or users of the circular product. We characterize the equilibrium for given degree of maturity of the sharing market, maximum consumers’ use intensity and marginal cost differences between the two varieties. Key to our results is whether consumers care for circularity. In the absence of environmental awareness, there is very little space for the circular product when coexisting with a standard variety: the circular good is more expensive, it has a lower market share, and results in lower, albeit positive, profits. Things change dramatically if consumers experience bad conscience when purchasing the standard version: the circular product continues to be more expensive, but it may beat the standard one in market share and profits. This can even result in the two firms offering the circular variety in equilibrium. Our findings suggest that consumers’ environmental awareness can be a key driver for the transition towards the circular economy.

    (With F. André, C. Ranocchia and S. Rousseau).

  • UT Dallas Conference Honoring Suresh Sethi, September 26-28, 2025

    There is a special conference honoring Prof. Suresh Sethi’s 80th birthday
    September 26-28, 2025 at the Jindal School of Management of UT Dallas (USA).

    Additional information about the conference is available at https://utd-om.org .

  • CANCELLED – GERAD Seminar: Sebastian Jaimungal

    Sebastian Jaimungal
    University of Toronto,
    Canada

    GERAD Seminar

    Broker-Trader Partial Information Nash-Equilibria

    May 22, 2025 03:00 PM — 04:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Hybrid seminar at GERAD joint with Quantact. Zoom webinar link

    In Person: room 4488
    Pavillon André-Aisenstadt
    Campus de l’Université de Montréal
    2920, chemin de la Tour Montréal Québec H3T 1J4
    Canada

    We study partial information Nash equilibrium between a broker and an informed trader. In this model, the informed trader, who possesses knowledge of a trading signal, trades multiple assets with the broker in a dealer market. Simultaneously, the broker trades these assets in a lit exchange where their actions impact the asset prices. The broker, however, only observes aggregate prices and cannot distinguish between underlying trends and volatility. Both the broker and the informed trader aim to maximize their penalizedexpected wealth. Using convex analysis, we characterize the Nash equilibrium and demonstrate its existence and uniqueness. Furthermore, we establish that this equilibrium corresponds to the solution of a nonstandard system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) that involves the two differing filtrations. For short enough time horizons, we prove that the solution of this system exists. Moreover, we show that the solution to the FBSDE system may be approximated by a power series in the strength of the transient impact to arbitrary order and prove that the error is controlled. If time permits, I will also discuss a new deep learning approach for approximating the solution to the system of FBSDEs.

    Dena Firoozi organizer