International Society of Dynamic Games

  • DGA Seminar: Seyyedreza Madani

    Seyyedreza Madani
    HEC Montréal
    Canada

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Investment in Vehicle to Grid and Distributed Energy Resources: Distributor versus Prosumer’s Perspectives and the Impact of Applicable Rates

    Apr 27, 2023
    11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Webinar link.

    In order for smart homes to be optimally deployed, the following questions should be addressed. Should the distribution company or the prosumer invest in DER and manage it? What combination of DER should be used? Furthermore, what is the right tariff to impose? This study investigates different aspects of smart home investment and management problems to address these questions. A mathematical model for controlling DER and EMS is developed and based on the real-world consumption and generation data and costs, the results are presented. They highlight the importance of deploying Vehicle to Grid (V2G) to make DER investments profitable.

    (with Pierre-Olivier Pineau)

  • Announcement: 2nd Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications

    Dear Colleagues,

    You are kindly invited to participate in the Second Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications, to be held in Paris on October 26-27, 2023.

    Additional information about the Workshop is available at 

    https://www.gerad.ca/colloques/Workshop-DGA-2023/index.html

    Looking forward to welcoming you in Paris.

    The organizers: Bertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek, Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, Georges Zaccour

  • DGA Seminar: Can Baris Cetin

    Can Baris Cetin
    HEC Montréal, Canada

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Strategic Pricing and Investment in Environmental Quality by an Incumbent Facing a Greenwasher Entrant

    Apr 20, 2023   11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Webinar link.

    In this study, we analyze the effect of greenwashing on firms’ strategies and outcomes and consumers. We consider a two-stage game where a monopolist makes pricing and environmental quality investment in the first stage and competes with an entrant in the second stage. The incumbent is a green firm and does not overrate the environmental quality of its product, while the entrant may be tempted by greenwashing. We assume that only inexperienced consumers, that is, consumers who did not purchase the product in the first period, can be lured by greenwashing. Consequently, our model captures two important dynamic features, namely, the change in the competitive structure, and the presence of a “learning” effect in the market. We investigate the conditions that make greenwashing profitable for the entrant, how the incumbent responds to greenwashing, and the impact of greenwashing on the environment and customers.

    (with Arka Mukherjee and Georges Zaccour)