Dear Colleagues,
You are kindly invited to participate in the Second Workshop on Dynamic Games and Applications, to be held in Paris on October 26-27, 2023.
Additional information about the Workshop is available at
https://www.gerad.ca/colloques/Workshop-DGA-2023/index.html
Looking forward to welcoming you in Paris.
The organizers: Bertrand Crettez, Naila Hayek, Nikolaos Pnevmatikos, Georges Zaccour
Can Baris Cetin
HEC Montréal, Canada
Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar
Strategic Pricing and Investment in Environmental Quality by an Incumbent Facing a Greenwasher Entrant
Apr 20, 2023 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)
Webinar link.
In this study, we analyze the effect of greenwashing on firms’ strategies and outcomes and consumers. We consider a two-stage game where a monopolist makes pricing and environmental quality investment in the first stage and competes with an entrant in the second stage. The incumbent is a green firm and does not overrate the environmental quality of its product, while the entrant may be tempted by greenwashing. We assume that only inexperienced consumers, that is, consumers who did not purchase the product in the first period, can be lured by greenwashing. Consequently, our model captures two important dynamic features, namely, the change in the competitive structure, and the presence of a “learning” effect in the market. We investigate the conditions that make greenwashing profitable for the entrant, how the incumbent responds to greenwashing, and the impact of greenwashing on the environment and customers.
(with Arka Mukherjee and Georges Zaccour)
Victor Shi
Lazaridis School of Business and Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada
Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar
Partial Centralization in a Durable-Good Supply Chain
Apr 6, 2023 11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal Summer Time)
Most supply chain research assumes complete centralization or complete decentralization but omits the commonly adopted structure of partial centralization. With partial centralization, a firm owns a portion, but not all, of its partner. In this paper, we analyze partial centralization in a supply chain where a durable-good manufacturer owns part of its downstream retailer. We start with a two-period model and derive analytical equilibrium outcomes of the supply chain. Our analysis reveals that first, partial centralization can become the equilibrium supply chain structure. Second, the manufacturer’s equilibrium ownership level in the retailer decreases in product durability and decision horizon length.