International Society of Dynamic Games

  • 20th ISDG Symposium: Valladolid, Spain, 9-12 July, 2024

    The next ISDG Symposium will be held on

    July 9-12, 2024 in Valladolid, Spain

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    See you in Valladolid,

    Guiomar Martín-Herrán
    Arne Traulsen (Co-Chairs of the Program Committee)


  • DGA Seminar: Vassili Kolokoltsov

    Vassili N. Kolokoltsov
    High School of Economics
    Russia

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Principle of quadratic fines for inspection/corruption games

    October 19, 2023
    11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Webinar link

    Games of inspection and corruption are well developed in the game-theoretic literature. In author’s paper “Inspection -corruption game of illegal logging and other violations: generalized evolutionary approach” (Mathematics MDPI 2021, 9(14), 1619) a generalised evolutionary approach was developed based on the general framework of the pressure -resistance games of author’s paper “The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration” (Mathematics of Operations Research), 42 (2017), no. 4, 915 – 944). An evolution of a two-level hierarchy was constructed, where a local inspector can be corrupted and is further controlled by the higher authority. Concerning a mathematical novelty, the model led to a switching generalised replicator dynamics (kinetic equations), where switching occurred on the effective frontier of corruption.

    In this framework the “principle of quadratic fines” was discovered stating that the quadratic growth of the fine function allows one to effectively control the level of violations. In the talk we present these ideas together with some recent developments showing the robustness of the principle of quadratic fine by extending the model in various directions.

  • DGA Seminar: Bacel Maddah

    Bacel Maddah
    American University of Beirut
    Lebanon

    Dynamic Games and Applications Seminar

    Pricing, Assortment, and Inventory Decisions under Nested Logit Demand and Equal Profit Margins

    October 12, 2023
    11:00 AM — 12:00 PM (Montreal time)

    Webinar link

    We consider the interdependent decisions on assortment, inventory and pricing of substitutable products under a nested logit consumer choice, and a single-period, newsvendor-type, supply setting. This applies to fashion goods. We assume that all products have equal profit margins. Under a Taylor series-type approximation, we derive several concavity properties of the expected profit function, and gain insights into the structure of the optimal solution. Our results allow developing an efficient, single-variable search, heuristic for jointly deciding on assortment, pricing, and inventory decisions. We argue that our approach continues to hold under more general consumer choice.