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       THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF DYNAMIC GAMES
       E-LETTER, issue No. 32, April 7, 1999

       Edited by Raimo P. Hamalainen and Harri Ehtamo
       Systems Analysis Laboratory, Helsinki University of Technology
       ISDG@HUT.FI http://www.hut.fi/Units/SAL/isdg 

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             Dear Dynamic Game Theorist,

This is the thirtysecond issue of the Society's electronic newsletter. The
basic minimum work principle in editing this e-letter is that the READERS
send important notes and information about symposia, conferences and
workshops of dynamic games, as well as abstracts of Ph.D.  theses, papers
and books, which they want to be included in the newsletter.  The format
is described below.  We hope that no retyping will be needed so please
follow the instructions and sample shown below carefully. 

The news should be concise to keep the newsletter readable.  Requests for
more complete information about any news item should be directed to its
contributor. 

We appreciate any comments and suggestions that you may have on this
e-letter.  

Looking  forward  to  receiving  your news contributions.


     Raimo P. Hamalainen        and         Harri Ehtamo


P.S.: We ENCOURAGE you now to submit any news items you may have
suitable to the electronic Newsletter. From November 19 (last issue)
we have got only one contribution! So, please send us if you have any!
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Contributed by the Editors <ISDG@HUT.FI>                           Apr 7

                      MODEL FOR NEWS SUBMISSIONS

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ISDG at HUT.FI
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Contributed by Tuomas Raivio <tuomas.raivio@hut.fi>                Apr 7

                            ISDG in the Web

The ISDG home page is located at

http://www.hut.fi/Units/SAL/isdg

The pages contain a short description of the society, a list of
members, and copies of past ISDG News.
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Contributed by C. Gonzalez-Alcon <cgalcon@ull.es>                  Apr 7


              PH.D. DISSERTATION AT LA LAGUNA UNIVERSITY


Author: C. Gonzalez-Alcon
Title: Economic Growth Models. Contributions from the Dynamic Games
Theory. 
Supervisor: J. Sicilia


The dilemma between consumption and economic growth is analyzed from
the dynamic game theory point of view. The economic agents are grouped in
generations that follow one another. Two generations overlap their
temporal live horizon at each period. Each generation has an active period
in which it controls the system and an inactive period. Within this
framework two decision processes are considered.

In the first, the consumption-investment distribution through the
active period of a generation is studied. The players are two classes of
agents with different interests and a partial control over the system.
This is modelled as a differential game. Efficient strategies and
open-loop Nash equilibria are discussed. The attention is devoted to the
case in which the players want the economy to reach certain goals at the
end of the temporal horizon.

In the second framework, each generation leaves the system to the
following generation in a certain state that depends on its
consumption level and influences its well-being throughout its
retirement stage. A perfect information game with an infinite number
of players is proposed. The players have a continuum of pure
strategies. For this model some stationary strategies are proposed and
conditions are given under which these strategies constitute Nash and
subgame perfect equilibria. The work defines "memoryless" and "fair"
strategies and it gives some general procedures to generate subgame
perfect equilibria of these types. The existence of the Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies for these overlapping generations' games is proved.
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End of ISDG E-LETTER issue No. 32, April 7, 1999