

Rutgers Business School Newark and New Brunswick



# **An Introduction to Search Games**

### Thomas Lidbetter Department of Management Science and Information Systems Monday 25<sup>th</sup> July 2022


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### Part I: Isaac's problem and Gal's solution Hide and seek on a network

- Rufus Isaacs (1965) Differential Games
- Shmuel Gal (1979) Search Games with Mobile and Immobile Hider
- Shmuel Gal (2000) On the Optimality of a Simple Strategy for Searching Graphs
- Steve Alpern (2011) A new approach to Gal's Theory of Search Games on Weakly Eulerian networks
- Steve Alpern, Thomas Lidbetter (2020) Search and delivery man problems: when are depth-first paths optimal?

#### Search for Immobile Hider on a Network

- Every arc a of a network Q has length L(a)
- Total length of Q is  $L(Q) = \mu$
- Distance function *d* on *Q* is the "shortest path" metric




## The game G = G(Q, O)

- Pure strategy for Hider (maximizer): a point in Q (not necessarily a node)
- Mixed strategy *h* for Hider is a distribution over *Q*
- For  $A \subseteq Q$ , write h(A) for the probability the Hider is in A
- Pure strategy for Searcher (minimizer) is a unit speed path  $S(t), t \ge 0$  which covers Q
- Mixed strategy for the Searcher is a probability distribution over such paths
- The payoff is the *search time*  $T = T(S, H) = \min\{t: S(t) = H\}$
- The function T is only *lower-semicontinuous* (uniform topology) but the game has a value V = V(Q, O), optimal mixed Searcher strategies and  $\varepsilon$ -optimal mixed Hider strategies.

### Search higher density regions first

For a fixed Q and Hider distribution h, which has a lower expected search time: X, A, B, Y or X, B, A, Y?



It turns out that the answer depends only on the *search density*  $\rho$  of A and B, where

$$\rho(\mathcal{C}) = h(\mathcal{C})/t(\mathcal{C})$$

and t(C) = time spent in C.

### Search higher density regions first

**Search density lemma**: For a fixed Hider distribution h on a network Q, suppose  $S_1$  is a search of Q that can be written as X, A, B, Y and  $S_2$  is a search that can be written as X, B, A, Y, where X, A and B are disjoint. Then  $T(S_1, h) \leq T(S_2, h)$  if and only if  $\rho(A) \geq \rho(B)$ , with equality if and only if the densities are equal.

**Proof:** Write  $T_A$  for the expected time spent to find the Hider in A, assuming he is in A. Similarly for  $T_B$ . Then

$$T(S_{2},h) - T(S_{1},h) = h(B)(t(X) + T_{B}) + h(A)(t(X) + t(B) + T_{A}) - h(A)(t(X) + T_{A}) - h(B)(t(X) + t(A) + T_{B})$$

$$= t(A)t(B)\left(\frac{h(A)}{t(A)} - \frac{h(B)}{t(B)}\right).$$

### **Uniform Hider strategy**

A mixed strategy always available to the Hider is the uniform strategy h = uwhich hides in any subset A of Q with probability proportional to its length, that is  $u(A) = L(A)/\mu$ .

**Lemma**: For any (Q, O) and any S,

$$T(S, u) \ge \mu/2.$$


Hence,  $V \ge \mu/2$ .

**Proof:** By time t, max. probability F(t) of finding the Hider is  $t/\mu$ , so

$$T(S,u) = \int_0^\infty 1 - F(t) \, dt \ge \int_0^\mu 1 - \frac{t}{\mu} \, dt = \mu/2.$$


### **Chinese Postman Tours**


- A covering path S is called a tour if it ends back at O
- If a tour has minimum length, denoted  $\bar{\mu}$ , it is called a *Chinese Postman Tour*
- A tour is called *Eulerian* if it has length  $\mu$  (traverses each edge exactly once)
- An Eulerian tour exists if all nodes have even degree (number of incident edges), in which case Q is called Eulerian and  $\mu = \overline{\mu}$



#### **Chinese Postman Tours**

#### Example






CPT: achfbgdfebi

### **Chinese Postman Tours**

**Lemma:** Any CPT of Q satisfies  $\bar{\mu} \leq 2\mu$  with equality only for trees.



#### Proof:

- Define Q' by doubling every arc of Q (add another arc of the same length with the same endpoints)
- All nodes of Q' have even degree so there is an Eulerian tour of length  $2\mu$
- This is also a covering tour of Q
- If Q is not a tree it contains a circuit (closed path of distinct arcs), whose arcs we do not need to double

#### **Random Chinese Postman Tours**

**Definition:** Suppose that  $S: [0, \overline{\mu}] \to Q$  is a CPT. Let  $S^r$  denote its reverse, given by  $S^r(t) = S(\overline{\mu} - t)$ . A Random Chinese Postman Tour (RCPT) s is an equiprobable mix of S and  $S^r$ .

**Lemma:** Let *s* be a RCPT on a network *Q* with root *O*. Then for any  $H \in Q$ ,  $T(s, H) \leq \overline{\mu}/2$ . Hence  $V \leq \overline{\mu}/2$ .

**Proof**: Let t be such that S(t) = H. Then  $T(S^r, H) \le \overline{\mu} - t$ . So

$$T(s,H) = \frac{1}{2}T(S,H) + \frac{1}{2}T(S^{r},H) \le \frac{1}{2}t + \frac{1}{2}(\bar{\mu}-t) = \bar{\mu}/2.$$

### Bounds on V = V(Q, O) for a general network


**Theorem:** For any network Q with root O, the value V = V(Q, O) of the search game for an immobile Hider satisfies

$$\frac{\mu}{2} \le V \le \frac{\bar{\mu}}{2} \le \mu.$$

The lower bound is tight if and only if Q is Eulerian. The bound  $V \leq \mu$  can only be tight if Q is a tree.

### Equal Branch Density (EBD) Hider Distribution for Trees

**Definition**: The EBD Hider distribution is concentrated on the leaf nodes and at every branch node the search density of all branches is equal.



### Depth-first search is a best response against the EBD

**Lemma:** Any depth-first search S is a best response against the EBD distribution, h and has expected search time  $T(S, h) = \mu$ .

#### Proof

- (i) Any two depth-first searches  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  have the same expected search time because  $S_1$  can be transformed into  $S_2$  by successively swapping the order of search of equal density subtrees that share a root.
- (ii) If S is any depth-first search and  $S^r$  is its time reverse search then for any leaf node v,

$$T(S, v) + T(S^r, v) = 2\mu,$$

SO

$$T(S,h) + T(S^r,h) = 2\mu,$$


SO

$$T(S,h) = T(S^r,h) = \mu.$$

(iii) Proof by contradiction that any depth-first search is a best response...

### Depth-first search is a best response against the EBD

(iii) (continued) If a best response S is not depth-first, it must be of the form:



### $V=\mu=\overline{\mu}$ for trees

**Theorem:** Let Q be a tree with root O. Then  $V = \mu$ .

**Proof:** (i)  $V \le \overline{\mu}/2 = \mu$  (Searcher uses RCPT) (ii)  $V \ge \mu$  (Hider uses EBD distribution)

**Arc-adding lemma:** Let Q be a network and let Q' be derived from adding an arc e of length  $\ell \ge 0$  between points x and y on Q. Then

1.  $V(Q') \leq V(Q) + 2\ell$  so  $V(Q') \leq V(Q)$  if we identify x and y (i.e.  $\ell = 0$ ).

2. If  $\ell \ge d_Q(x, y)$ , then  $V(Q') \ge V(Q)$ . Any hiding strategy on Q does just as well on Q'.

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1.  $V(Q') \leq V(Q) + 2\ell$  so  $V(Q') \leq V(Q)$  if we identify x and y (i.e.  $\ell = 0$ ).

**Proof:** Replace every pure S used in an optimal strategy s by S' which follows S until it reaches x, then tours e, then follows S again.

 $T(s,z) \le V(Q) + \ell$  for  $z \in e$ 

and

 $T(s,z) \leq V(Q) + 2\ell$  for  $z \notin e$ .

**Arc-adding lemma:** Let Q be a network and let Q' be derived from adding an edge e of length  $\ell \ge 0$  between points x and y on Q. Then


2. If  $\ell \ge d_Q(x, y)$ , then  $V(Q') \ge V(Q)$ . Any hiding strategy on Q does just as well on Q'.

**Proof:** Let *h* be optimal on *Q*. Let *h*' on *Q*' be same as *h* (don't hide in *e*). Note that for  $H \in Q$ ,

$$T_{Q'}(S',H) \ge T_Q(S,H),$$


where S is like S' but replacing e with the shortest path from x to y in Q.

**Proposition:** The network Q drawn below has  $V(Q) = \overline{\mu}/2$ .




**Definition:** A network is weakly Eulerian if it contains a disjoint set of Eulerian networks such that shrinking each to a point transforms the network into a tree.


Equivalently, a network is weakly Eulerian if removing all disconnecting edges leaves a network with only even degree nodes.





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
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








#### The "Three arc" network




 $3/2 = \mu/2 \le V(Q) \le \bar{\mu}/2 = 2$ 

If the Searcher successively chooses unsearched arcs at random, then

$$T(S,H) = \frac{1}{3}(1-x) + \frac{1}{3}(1+x) + \frac{1}{3}(3-x) = \frac{5-x}{3} \le \frac{5}{3}$$

So  $3/2 \le V(Q) \le 5/3$ .


#### The "Three arc" network



**Theorem** (L. Pavlovic): It is optimal for the Hider to choose *x* according to the p.d.f.

 $f(x) = 2e^{-x}, 0 < x < \ln 2 \approx 0.693.$ It is optimal for the Searcher to go to A, go distance y towards O, back to A, to O on another arc, to A on the untraversed arc, where y is chosen according to the c.d.f.


$$F(y) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{e^y}{4}, 0 \le y \le \ln 2.$$
$$V = (4 + \ln 2)/3 \approx 1.56$$



### Part II: Variations to the model


- Steve Alpern (2010) Search games on trees with asymmetric travel times
- Steve Alpern & Thomas Lidbetter (2014) Searching a variable speed network
- Steve Alpern & Thomas Lidbetter (2013) Mining coal or finding terrorists: the expanding search paradigm
- Steve Alpern (2011) Find-and-fetch search on a tree (2011)

### Variable speed network (tree)



- Define EBD using tour times  $\tau$  instead of lengths
- Define height δ(v) of a leaf node v as the difference between the time from 0 to v and the time from v to 0.
- Define the *incline* Δ as the average height of a leaf node, weighted according to EBD.


### Variable speed network (tree)



**Theorem:** The value of the variable speed search game is  $\frac{\tau+\Delta}{2}$ . The EBD is optimal for the Hider and it is optimal for the Searcher to use a probabilitistic "branching strategy".

## Applications of variable speed: 1. Kikuta-Ruckle game

- Like the original Isaacs-Gal game, but the Hider can only hide at nodes and each node v has a search cost  $c_v$ .
- Searcher can either continue without searching a node or pay the search cost to search it.
- Replace search cost of  $c_v$  with a "variable speed" arc with outward travel time  $c_v$  and inward travel time 0.



## Applications of variable speed: 2. Find-and-fetch

- Another variation on the classic model, where the Searcher has to return the Hider to the root (eg. search and rescue, foraging)
- Add a variable speed arc to each leaf node v with outward travel time equal d(0, v) and inward travel time equal -d(0, v).

## Applications of variable speed: 3. Expanding search

- Searcher picks a sequence of arcs  $a_1, a_2, \dots$  such that  $a_1$  is incident to the root and each  $a_1$  is incident to a node already reached.
- Suitable in cases where the cost to retrace your steps is negligible, eg. mining coal, searching for landmines.
- Can also model search with many searchers.
- For trees, this can be modeled by variable speed search: an arc of length *a* can be replaced by a variable speed arc with outward travel time *a* and inward travel time 0.

## Part III: Search games with multiple hidden objects

- Hider hides k balls in n boxes
- Cost of searching box *j* is *c<sub>j</sub>*
- Searcher looks in boxes one by one till finding all the balls
- Payoff is cost of finding all the balls.

**Lemma:** The Hider can make the Searcher indifferent between all her strategies by choosing a subset *H* of *k* boxes with probability  $p^*(H) = \frac{\prod_{i \in H} c_i}{S_k}$ , where  $S_k = \sum_{|A|=k} \sum_{i \in A} c_i$ . All orderings have expected cost

$$C-\frac{S_{k+1}}{S_k},$$

Where  $C = \sum_{j=1}^{n} c_j$ .



Eg. (k = 3) This choice of *H* is picked with probability proportional to  $3 \times 3 \times 2 = 18$ .


**Proof:** For the ordering 1, 2, ..., n, the expected cost of boxes *not searched* is

$$\sum_{j=k+1}^{n} c_j \sum_{H \in [j-1]^{(k)}} p^*(H) = \sum_{j=k+1}^{n} c_j \sum_{H \in [j-1]^{(k)}} \frac{\prod_{i \in H} c_i}{S_k} = \frac{S_{k+1}}{S_k}.$$

**Theorem:** The value of the game is  $V = C - \frac{S_{k+1}}{S_k}$ . It is optimal for the Searcher to start by opening a subset H of k boxes with probability  $p^*(H)$  and to open the remaining boxes in a (uniformly) random order. An optimal strategy for the Hider is  $p^*$ .

#### **Proof:**


- Restrict the Searcher to strategies of the form  $s_A =$  "search all boxes in A then search the remaining boxes in a random order", where |A| = k.
- Then payoff of  $s_A$  against B is same as payoff of  $s_B$  against A for |A| = |B| = k.



Expected search cost = (7 + 2 + 6)+3 +  $\frac{1}{2}(3)$ 

Expected search cost = (7 + 3 + 2)+6 +  $\frac{1}{2}(3)$ 

#### In general



- All boxes in A and B must be searched. Remaining boxes are all searched with the same probability.
- So payoff matrix is symmetric
- Thus Searcher can use strategy  $p^*$  to make Hider indifferent between all his strategies. Both players indifferent  $\Rightarrow$  equilibrium.